Abstract. From a point of view of Articial General Intelligence, RL learners like Hutter's universal, Pareto optimal, incomputable AIXI heavily rely on the denition of the rewards, which are necessarily given by some "teacher" to dene the tasks to solve. AIXI, as is, cannot therefore be said to be a fully autonomous agent. Furthermore, it has recently been shown that AIXI can converge to a suboptimal behavior in certain situations, hence showing the intrinsic diculty of RL, with its non-obvious pitfalls.
Introduction
In 2000, Hutter proposed the rst universal and formal, though incomputable model of an intelligent agent, AIXI [3, 2, 1] . It relies on the Reinforcement Learning framework [11] and should allow us (with computable approximations, compare [12] ) to solve any practical problem as long as we are able to dene the rewards.
However it was recently proved that AIXI can in certain situations stop exploring, leading to suboptimal behavior [6] . Instead of viewing this result as a aw of the model, given its natural denition, one can view this as a hint as to why the Reinforcement Learning framework is intrinsically dicult: Given the Pareto optimality of AIXI, no learner (computable or not) can hope to behave better on average.
We propose a new model of a universal intelligent agent, where reward signals are entirely removed. The goal of the agent is no more to maximize the expected reward, but to entirely explore the world in a optimal way. We call this kind of agents Knowledge-Seeking Agents (KSA).
Passive Prediction, Active Learning, Reinforcement Learning. Solomono Induction is dened for passive prediction [10] : the agent does not output any action and thus cannot inuence the environment behavior. As a consequence, learning is "easy": the predictor converges to optimal prediction in approximately K(q) errors, (where K is Kolmogorov's complexity [5] , and q is the sequence to predict).
AIXI is dened in the Reinforcement Learning setting, which is much harder than passive prediction, because of the active setting, which means that the decisions of the agent may modify the behavior of the environment, and because there are rewards to maximize. For example, even in some simple classes of environments, no learning agent can hope to converge in less than 2 K(q) errors. Knowledge-seeking agents are halfway between these two settings: They are active learning (incomputable) agents, but do not use rewards to guide their behavior. We will show that this allow for a convergence proof in this active setting that was not possible in the RL setting.
Articial General Intelligence. Hutter described AIXI as a suitable model for universal intelligence, in the sense that this agent should be able to solve any computable problem we might give it.
But regarding Articial General Intelligence (AGI), such an agent is not fully autonomous. Indeed, it still requires a "teacher", someone to give it the rewards: even though the RL framework supposes that the rewards are dened by the environment (which gives to understand that we need not care about them), if we create an RL robot, we will still need to dene the rewards completely, in order to dene precisely what the agent should achieve. AIXI can be viewed as a "servant" AGI agent, which must serve its teacher, whereas a KSA could be viewed as "free" AGI agent, depending on no one.
Furthermore, we will need to be extremely careful about how we dene the rewards and how they are given to the RL agent, supposedly vastly intelligent. For example, how will the agent behave if it is not switched o when its task is done? Will it want to undo it in order to do it again? Can it be switched o, and will it resist being switched o, since this would prevent it from receiving further rewards? Or can we make it like (with rewards) being switched o? If so how can we prevent it from switching itself o to get rewards?
Another related concern is whether it would try to bypass the human control to give itself the rewards. RL agents tend to nd "shortcuts" to make the minimum eort to receive the rewards. This should be especially true for very intelligent agents. We will then need to be careful that such unexpected shortcuts do not exist, which may not be a trivial matter. Hutter writes [2] :
Suciently intelligent agents may increase their rewards by psychologically manipulating their human "teachers", or by threatening them.
For example, if humans use a button to control the rewards of the agent, the latter should by all means acquire the control of this button, which may lead to undesired situations.
Hopefully all these problems may have solutions, but this shows that dening rewards for a real-world RL AGI is far from a trivial matter.
Would a KSA be useful? A knowledge-seeking agent would not depend on any external intelligent entity, and would be fully autonomous. One drawback would of course be that we humans would have more diculties to make it solve our specic problems, as it would have its own drives. But it may still be possible to use pieces of knowledge as rewards, at least up to some point. One other possibility would be to show the agent that it would itself gain knowledge if it helped us with some particular problem. Temporarily switching o the agent could be used as a punishment, since during this time the agent cannot explore the world. The agent could also be biased by showing only an adequate part of the world, either real or simulated.
However, we believe it would not be the right way to use a KSA. In fact it may be of much more interest than RL agents and their narrow goals 1 . Indeed, a KSA would need to be inventive to acquire as much information about the world as possible, creating its own tools, designing its own experiments, etc. For example, it may try to come up with its own unied theory of physics, and may invent new mathematical tools. We humans could gain a lot of knowledge by working along with it (or a computational variant, obviously), instead of directing it. It may create a lot of usable, unpredicted byproducts in the process. Such an agent could even be viewed as the optimal scientist. AGI knowledge-seeking agents would therefore be perfect complements of AGI RL agents.
After some notation, we dene a rst knowledge-seeking agent, the Square-KSA, and we prove convergence properties, showing that it behaves according to expectation. The second agent, Shannon-KSA, based on Shannon's entropy, is then introduced, and some of its properties are exhibited. We nally conclude with some remarks.
Notation
A string s 1 s 2 . . . s n ∈ S n is a succession of s t ∈ S, ordered by t. We write s n:m = s n s n+1 . . . s m , and also s <t = s 1:t−1 . We note yx t ≡ y t x t .
At each new step t, the agent outputs an action y t ∈ Y depending on the history of interaction yx <t = y 1 x 1 y 2 x 2 . . . y t−1 x t−1 , then the environment outputs x t ∈ X depending on yx <t y t , and then the next step t + 1 begins.
The size of a string is denoted |yx 1:t | = |x 1:t | = t. Note that this is dierent from the length l(x) of a string which is dened as the number of bits used to encode x on the device under consideration, such as a Turing machine.
We abbreviate yx <t into h when clear from the context.
Q is the set of all computable environments or programs. An environment q ∈ Q is consistent with history yx <t if q(y <t ) = x <t , i.e. if the execution of the program q on the input string y <t outputs the string x <t . We note Q t or Q h the set of environments/programs that are consistent with history yx <t = h. Greek letters are probability distributions over interactions strings and priors over programs. We will often write ρ(yx t:k | yx <t ) for convenience, brevity and clarity, whereas one should really read ρ(x t:k | yx <t y t:k ) since the actions are not random variables but are chosen deterministically by the agent.
For a set Q i of programs, we note ρ(Q i ) = q∈Qi ρ(q). First we recall the denition of AIXI [2] . After history of interaction yx <t , the value of future time step k after some predicted interaction yx t:k−1 is:
where r k is the reward extracted from the input x k , w t,k is called the horizon function and attributes a weight to each future time step k, depending on the present time t. The prior ξ attributes a probability to each continuation of a given input string. It is similar to Solomono's prior [10] . With h = yx <t :
and ξ(q) = 2 −l(q) where l(q) is the length in bits of q on a universal prex Turing machine.
The action at time step t is chosen by:
Now we generalize AIXI from the RL setting: We replace the rewards r k by a generic utility function u t (yx 1:k ); we also replace ξ by a generic universal distribution ρ satisfying:
We also note:
The generalized version of the value function is:
We call agents dened by (15) universal agents A ρ (w t,k , u t (yx 1:k )). In this paper, we will use two dierent horizon functions:
where m t = t + m t and m t is monotonically growing with t. The rst one makes the agent use its prediction for all the next m t steps, whereas the second one makes the agent only care about one distant step m t . As a simplication, in this paper we will only consider deterministic environments, but we expect all the results to extend smoothly to computable stochastic environments. 4 Square Knowledge-Seeking Agent
Now let us specify the general value function (5) for some particular horizon function and utility function. We want our agent to converge as quickly as possible toward the true environment, i.e. it must choose its actions in order to gain as much knowledge as possible about the environment.
For this, we use a particular property of ρ (and hence of ξ): It dominates all computable environments, which means that if q 0 is the true environment, then ρ(h) > ρ(q 0 ). Hence, trying to minimize ρ(h) should make the agent discard (render inconsistent) as many environments as possible (and preferably the most probable ones rst). Therefore we set u t (yx 1:k ) = −ρ(yx t:k | yx <t ), and we dene Square-KSA ρ with A ρ (w = t,k , −ρ(yx t:k | yx <t )). As in [2] , by applying the chain rule (4) repeatedly, we can put equation (5) in iterative form:
We see that the value function is a maximization of a well-known entropy function [4] .
Intuitively, the agent will try to take actions that will lead to future strings of lower probability, which makes the agent gain the most information about the environment. However, such strings, being improbable, will gain information only with little probability. Conversely, highly probable strings have obviously a high probability to occur, but give little information about the environment: it is not informative to take actions which outcomes are predictable. Therefore, the agent must make a trade-o in order to gain as much information as possible, and chooses actions that maximize the entropy of environments.
Optimal non-learning agent
On the model of AIMU for AIXI [2] , we can dene a generic optimal non-learning agent A µ , with which to compare the learning agent, for given utility and horizon functions. This is done by simply changing ρ to µ in equation (5), where µ is the probability distribution of the true environment. In the case of deterministic environments, for a given string of actions y <t , µ(yx <t ) = 1 if the environment generates the string x <t , and 0 otherwise.
is optimal w.r.t. the horizon function w t,k and the utility function u t (yx 1:k ) in deterministic environments.
Proof. By construction: A µ , knowing µ, and therefore knowing the future, knows the exact outcome of each string of future actions. By (5) (with ρ replaced by µ), it tests all of them and chooses the one with the highest utility. The existence of an action string of higher utility would be a contradiction.
In the case of stochastic computable environments, an agent may nd sometimes a better string of actions than A µ , but if its probability distribution over the actions is dierent from µ, it would lose on average.
In the case of Square-KSA ρ , the optimal non-learning agent Square-KSA µ is dened by:
Thus we have: Square-KSA µ ≡A µ (w = t,k , −ρ(yx t:mt |yx <t )). Square-KSA µ will therefore always choose the optimal action, knowing how the environment will respond, in order to decrease ρ(h) the most.
Asymptotic Optimality
It is dicult to give optimality criteria for universal agents, because some unexpected problems may occur, as described in [2] . Therefore, Hutter provided a new denition of optimality, called asymptotic learnability: In the limit, the agent should behave as well as the optimal agent.
The original, "weak" version is:
which can be extended to a "strong" version as dened in [6] :
A convergence in the weak sense can still create an innite cumulated loss compared to a strong convergence. 
t . First we transform the value function of Square-KSA ρ a bit:
The denominator can be dropped if we are only interested in comparing relative values (and not in "absolute" values).
5.1 Separability Denition 1. We say that two environments q 1 and q 2 are h−separable if there exists a string of actions up to the horizon that makes these two environments output a dierent string of inputs:
By extension, we call q 1 a h−separable environment if it is h−separable from the true environment q 0 . Lemma 1. If q 1 and q 2 are two h−separable environments, the Square-KSA agent is assured to discard a number of environments which cumulated probability is at least min(ρ(q 1 ), ρ(q 2 ))/2:
Proof. Let q 1 and q 2 be two h−separable environments at time t.
gt . Let y sep t a string of actions of size m t − t + 1 that makes q 1 and q 2 h−separable, and let y min t a string of the same size that does not. If no y min t exists, then the lemma is trivially true. For clarity during this proof, we omit the indexes t when clear from the context.
As V is an entropy function, the minimum value achieved if q 1 and q 2 are h−separable is when the distribution of the environments is as little spread as possible. To do so, we arbitrarily choose all environments except q 2 to be consistent with the true environment up to the horizon (but recall that q 1 and q 2 have interchangeable roles). From (8) , when dropping the denomitor, we have:
Suppose there is an action string y min so that V (y sep ) < V (y min ), but that would discard a minimal fraction d of g: 0 < d < min(b, c). Environments q 1 , q 2 and the true environment q 0 must not be h−separable by y min , otherwise we would have d > min(b, c). At constant entropy, the minimal fraction d is achieved when this fraction d is as spread as possible over the remaining "slots" (input strings for a given action string). Therefore, for a value at least as high as V (y sep ), the agent is assured to gain at least this fraction d. We will then show that this fraction has a minimum, ensuring a sucient descrease in g t each time q 1 and q 2 are h−separable. Since q 1 and q 2 must not be separable by y min , we also have
Maximum entropy with minimal gain d spread over N t = |X | mt−t+1 − 1 slots is achieved by:
where we considered that q 1 and q 2 are not separable from q 0 . We have:
Solving this equation for d gives:
We are only interested in the lower bound. From algebra (see section 8), we have:
and:
∀c, N, 0.5 ≤ c ≤ 1, N > 1 :
So we have:
Note that at time k, t < k
is still the value for maximum dispersion (with y min k sux of y min t ), since yx t:k−1 only discarded whole "slots" (input sequences), so the distributions inside the remaining slots has not changed for a particular action string. Therefore, like at time t, doing any other action string than y min k that have higher value than V k (y min k ) can only be better. This lemma ensures that even if y sep is not chosen, and so neither q 1 nor q 2 may be discarded after the chosen string of actions, at least a certain fraction is discarded.
Lemma 2. If q 0 and q 2 are suciently often h−separable environments, where q 0 is the true environment, then eventually q 2 will be discarded:
Proof. From lemma 1 and its proof, where we identify q 0 with q 1 , after executing the chosen string of actions (either y sep or some y min ), we have:
Since b t and c t can only grow with t, this implies that g t decreases to 0 at least as fast as a geometric progression, when q 0 and q 2 are repeatedly h−separable. So either lim t→∞ g t = 0, or either q 0 or q 2 is discarded once
2 ), i.e. the fraction of the cumulated probability of the programs other than q 0 and q 2 is not sucient to make an entropy that is higher than discarding either q 0 or q 2 . Since q 0 cannot be discarded, q 2 is eventually discarded. Lemma 3. In deterministic environments, when yx <t is chosen by Square-KSA: Proof. Recursive application of lemma 2 for all environments shows that for any > 0, any environment q with ρ(q) > either gets discarded at some point or remains non separable from the true environment q 0 forever after some time step T .
Therefore the relative probability of the sequence generated by program q 0 , which is the same as the sequence generated by any non-h−separable (from q 0 ) environment, tends to 1.
, is strongly asymptotically optimal in deterministic environments.
Proof. Follows immediately from lemma 3 and equations (6) and (7).
This important property ensures that the agent cannot be "tricked" to prevent it from achieving its goal, and does not have an undesired behavior w.r.t. its utility function, unlike AIXI.
As higher probability environments have a higher minimal entropy when h−separable, the agent will take actions to eliminate such environments early. We thus expect a fast, or even asymptotic optimally fast convergence to µ, but this remains to be shown.
The only case where the agent may gain little knowledge is when ρ(q 1 ) ρ(q 0 ) and ρ(q 1 ) > g/2. This means that q 1 is very probable, not only a priori but also from experience. However, the agent will eventually choose a string of actions that discard q 1 , but this may be long if all other environments (including q 0 ) are very improbable. Nonetheless, since the agent chooses its actions to try to eliminate (roughly speaking) as many environments as possible, its behavior may lead it earlier, by "chance", to discard q 1 earlier.
Full separability
Denition 2. Two environments q 1 and q 2 areh−separable if they are not h−separable within the horizon m t but would be h−separable with a larger m t .
By extension, we call q 1 ah−separable environment if it ish−separable from the true environment q 0 .
It is plausible that some environments may be constantlyh−separable, thus constantly avoiding to be discarded.
First, it is not certain that such environments are computable, as they might need to know what actions the agent will take in order to provably remain h−separable.
Second, it must be noted that neither Square-KSA ρ nor Square-KSA µ can foresee the separability of q 0 beyond the horizon, so this does not prevent Square-KSA ρ to converge to Square-KSA µ . From their point of view, such environments behave exactly like the true environment.
Third, if the horizon m t = m t − t is growing, in the limit, the size of the sequence that could separate q 0 would be innite (although nite at any step t), and therefore q 0 would become practically indistinguishable from q 0 . Hence such environments may not be of real importance.
The speed at which m t is growing does not seem to be signicant, unless it is uncomputable. In that latter case, we show a full separability property: Theorem 3. If the horizon m t grows faster than any computable function, no environment can beh−separable an innite number of times. Proof. By contradiction.
For every computable function f (t) monotonically growing to innity, there exists a computable functionḟ (t) = f (f (t)) which grows faster than f (t), and thus no computable function grows faster than all others. Hence m t is not computable.
Let the computable environments q 0 and q 0 be innitely oftenh−separable for the horizon m t by the string y , which should be computable if q 0 and q 0 are computable, monotonically grows at least as fast as m t by denition of y sep t , and so is not computable. Therefore q 0 is not computable. 6 Shannon-KSA
We can also dene a knowledge-seeking agent by taking the logarithm (base 2) in the previous utility function:
Hence for this new agent Shannon-KSA ρ : when applying the chain rule (4) repeatedly. This agent thus computes and compares Shannon's entropy [9] for strings of actions.
Theorem 4. A universal agent with utility function u t,k = − log ρ(yx k | yx <k ) and horizon function w t,k = w ≤ t,k is identical to a universal agent with utility function u t,k = − log ρ(yx t:k | yx <t ) and horizon function w t,k = w = t,k .
Proof. We start with the rst agent. For clarity, we omit the actions y.
We used the chain rule (4) and the additivity property of the log function.
This shows that Shannon-KSA is not "merely" looking at the nal step, but that all intermediate steps are equally taken into account.
We expect Shannon-KSA ρ to also be strongly asymptotically optimal.
Curiosity Seeking Complexity
Suppose we take ρ = ξ. For each "slot" for the entropy (i.e. for each possible future input string up to the horizon for a given actino string), if we consider that lower probability environments are of marginal contribution to ξ when compared to the highest probability environment, the utility function becomes:
where K is the prex Kolmogorov complexity [5] . Then we can interpret this as follows: The agent chooses its actions to maximize the Kolmogorov complexity of (its knowledge of) the environment.
Shannon's entropy, usually measured in bits, makes here a lot of sense: The utility function says the agent tries to gain as many bits of information/complexity as possible. This approximate formulation of Shannon-KSA ξ has strong links with Schmidhuber's "curiosity learning" for RL [7, 8] , where the agent receives internal rewards for compressing the sequence predictor. 7 Discussion and conclusion
We dened a new kind of universal intelligent agents, named knowledge-seeking agents, which dier signicantly from the traditional Reinforcement Learning framework and its associated universal optimal learner AIXI: Their purpose is not to solve particular, narrow tasks, given or dened by experts like humans, but to be fully autonomous, and to depend on no external intelligent entity. Full autonomy is an important property if we are to create Articial General Intelligences, that should match or surpass human or even humanity intelligence. We believe such agents (or their computational variants) should turn out to be useful to humanity in a dierent way than RL agents, since they should constantly be creative and solve interesting problems that we may not yet know.
It seems that this kind agent can still be directed to some extent, either by using pieces of knowledge as rewards, or by controlling the parts of the environment the agent interacts with, or by giving it prior knowledge. But these are only temporary biases that decrease in strength as the agent acquires knowledge, in the convergence to optimality.
In the real world, where all agents are mortal in some way, it is unlikely that a KSA would be too curious so as to threaten its own live, since a (predicted) death would prevent it from acquiring more knowledge.
We proved convergence of Square-KSA to the optimal non-learning variant of this agent for a class of horizon functions, meaning that it behaves according to expectation, even in the limit, in all computable environments. In case the horizon function grows uncomputably fast, we also proved that any environment that is dierent from the true one suciently often is eventually discarded. In the case that the horizon function grows only in a computable way, we showed that environments that may not be discarded tend to be indistinguishable from the true environment in the limit.
The related agent, Shannon-KSA, based on Shannon's entropy, has interesting properties and its value function can be interpreted in terms of how many bits of complexity (information) the agent can expect to gain by doing a particular string of actions, and we expect this agent to also be asymptotically optimal.
As for AIXI, we expect the various KSA properties to extend nicely to stochastic computable environments.
We also expect Square-KSA ρ or Shannon-KSA ρ (or both) to be Pareto optimal, to converge quickly, in an optimal way to the true environment, i.e. no learning agent should acquire knowledge faster.
We are currently trying to get rid of the horizon function in an optimal way. One possibility could be to choose an horizon based on ρ(h).
Another important concern is obviously how to optimally (for some denition of optimality) scale down Square-KSA ρ to a computable agent. Proof. Proof. m t = f ( f −1 (t) ) ∧ ∀t 1 , t 2 , 0 < t 1 < t2 :
Proof.
